Klearchos A. Kyriakides, Agora Dialogue, 9 January 2017
In his seminal book, Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle considers the virtues associated with justice, as well as the vices inherent in injustice. In this context, Aristotle engages in a deep discussion as to the two types of transaction into which a party may enter.
On the one hand, there are just transactions into which a party may enter voluntarily.
On the other hand, there are unjust transactions, which may come about for clandestine reasons or in response to a show of violence.
The Aristotelian distinction between the just and the unjust transaction is clearly relevant to the predicament which Cypriots have found themselves on so many occasions in history.
In the summer of 1878, for instance, Cypriots suddenly discovered that they and their island were subject to the terms of the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 4 June 1878.
That Convention had been concluded in secret, behind closed doors and behind the backs of Cypriots. Thereafter, the Convention was unceremoniously dumped on Cypriots. Was that just? If the British imperial administration in Nicosia came into existence pursuant to a secret agreement reached in 1878, its demise followed a similar process. In February 1959, Cypriots suddenly discovered that they and their island were now subject to the terms of the Greek-Turkish Zurich Agreement of 11 February 1959 and the five-party London Agreement of 19 February 1959. In common with the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1878, the Zurich and London Agreements had been concluded in secret, behind closed doors and behind the backs of Cypriots. Thereafter, the Agreements were unceremoniously dumped on Cypriots.
Was that just?
All these decades later, will a similar pattern of procedural unfairness unfold during the ‘Conference on Cyprus’ which is scheduled to convene in Geneva with five parties on 12 January 2017?
Time will tell. In the meantime, it is arguable that the ‘Conference on Cyprus’ in Geneva on 12 January 2017 was itself arranged in a procedurally unfair and otherwise unjust manner in keeping with what occurred in 1878 and in 1959. The immediate background to the ‘Conference on Cyprus’ in Geneva was formed by a brusque statement delivered by Ambassador Huseyin Muftuoglu, the Spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, the Occupying Power in the Turkish-occupied north of the Republic of Cyprus.
On 23 November 2016, it was announced that Ambassador Muftuoglu had declared that the ‘[d]ate of the five-party conference which will be held with the attendance of the guarantors should be decided without delay’. Ambassador Muftuoglu proceeded to assert that the continuation of negotiations in Cyprus ‘will benefit both sides’. This was a veiled reference to the Greek Community and the Turkish Community of the Republic of Cyprus, the two quasi-Ottoman and ethno-religious entities formed on 16 August 1960 as a result of the Zurich and London Agreements of February 1959
(Source: ‘Muftuoglu: “Date of the five-party conference should be decided without delay”, press release issued by the so-called ‘TRNC Public Information Office’, 23 November 2016:http://pio.mfa.gov.ct.tr/en/muftuoglu-date-of-the-five-party-conference-should-be-decided-without-delay/ last accessed on 6 January 2017.)
Ambassador Muftuoglu studiously avoided mentioning the Republic of Cyprus. No doubt this was because Turkey no longer recognises the Republic of Cyprus. This despite the fact that Turkey was one of the parties to the Treaty of Establishment of 1960 which brought the Republic of Cyprus into being. This also despite the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960 under which Turkey, as well as Greece and the United Kingdom, is obliged to ‘recognise and guarantee the sovereignty, territorial integrity and security’ of the Republic of Cyprus. One week or so after the instructions transmitted by Ambassador Muftuoglu, Mr Nicos Anastasiades and Mr Mustafa Akinci, the ‘two leaders’ of the ‘two communities’, otherwise known as the ‘two sides’, obediently complied. Messrs Anastasiades and Akinci did so on 1 December 2016 after meeting in secret, behind closed doors and behind the backs of Cypriots.
The evidence may be found in a statement issued by the United Nations on 1 December 2016: ‘In line with their joint resolve to reach a comprehensive settlement as soon as possible, they [i.e. the ‘two leaders’ of the ‘two communities’] further decided that they will meet in Geneva on the 9th of January 2017. On the 11th of January, they will present their respective maps. From the 12th of January, a Conference on Cyprus will be convened with the added participation of the [three] guarantor powers [namely Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom]. Other relevant parties shall be invited as needed.’
(Source: website of the UN Cyprus Talks (www.uncyprustalks.org) athttp://188.8.131.52/2016/12/01/statement-by-the-united-nations-spokesperson/ last accessed on 9 January 2017.)
After an uproar had erupted in the Republic of Cyprus because of the above statement’s failure to mention expressly this sovereign state, the Deputy Government Spokesman of the Republic of Cyprus handed out a Written Statement on 10 December 2016. This reiterated that ‘on 12 January , a Conference on Cyprus [is] to begin, with the participation of the two sides [i.e. the ‘two communities’] and the three guarantor powers, for the international dimension of the Cyprus problem, Security and Guarantees.’
The statement also affirmed that in view of the wording of the statement issued by the UN on 1 December 2016 ‘the presence of the Republic of Cyprus is absolutely necessary as a relevant party’ since one of the objectives of the Conference is ‘the amendment of international treaties that concern her.’
(Source: Statement by the Deputy Government Spokesman of the Republic of Cyprus, 10 December 2016 atwww.pio.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio2013.nsf/All/9A5A564F53070D2AC22580850038E1A6?OpenDocument&L=E last accessed on 9 January 2017.)
In other words, or so it seems, the ‘two leaders’ had effectively bowed to Turkey’s demands, namely that a ‘five-power conference’ should be arranged and that a decision over this matter should be made ‘without delay’. After a fresh uproar sparked by the clarification issued on 10 December 2016, the media reported that Mr Nicos Anastasiades – either in his capacity as President of the Republic of Cyprus or as ‘Leader’ of the Greek Community – had issued a further clarification.
Mr Anastasiades claimed that he would be attending the forthcoming ‘Conference’ in Geneva while wearing his two ‘hats’ as President of the Republic of Cyprus and as ‘Leader’ of what he described as ‘the Greek Cypriot Community’. Mr Anastasiades did not appear to dispute the Turkish spin to the effect that the ‘Conference’ would involve not more than and not less than ‘five parties’. Indeed, Mr Anastasiades went out of his way to give every impression that he would be wearing two ‘hats’ in Geneva.
(Source: Sigma Live, 4 January 2017: http://www.sigmalive.com/news/kypriako/393397/me-dipli-idiotita-sti-genevi-o-proedros-tis-dimokratias last accessed on 7 January 2017.)
For the sake of an accurate public record, it should not go without saying at this point that the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus refers to ‘the Greek Community’ (not ‘the Greek Cypriot Community’) and ‘the Turkish Community’ (not ‘the Turkish Cypriot Community’). In addition, the Constitution fails to make any express mention of any ‘Leader’ or ‘Leaders’. It follows that the Constitution does not expressly convey any constitutional or legal powers upon any such ‘Leaders’.
‘Democracies die behind closed doors’
In the light of the above, the citizens and lawful residents of the Republic of Cyprus are entitled to be apprehensive, as well as puzzled. After all, the secret meetings held in two stages in Geneva in January 2017 may pave the way towards the dissolution of the Republic of Cyprus as it is currently constituted. These meetings may also lead to the metamorphosis of the Republic of Cyprus into – or its replacement by – a ‘bi-communal, bi-zonal federation’.
As such, any settlement may purport to legalise the de facto consequences of the human rights violations and what appear to be the forcible transfers and other grave crimes committed during and after the Turkish invasion of the Republic of Cyprus, as launched on 20 July 1974 and as re-launched on 14 August 1974.
More broadly, the secret meetings in Geneva may result in the conclusion of an overall settlement with life-changing consequences for the citizens and lawful inhabitants of the Republic of Cyprus. By extension, any such settlement may also have the effect of promoting ‘bi-communalism’ and ‘bi-zonality’. In the submission of this writer, such an outcome would gravely undermine the rule of law and the democratic values of the European Union.
At the same time, it would effectively lock the European Union into an undesirable and potentially irreversible new relationship with Turkey. This at a time when President Erdogan is seemingly accelerating the transformation of Turkey into a militaristic Islamist tyranny with scant regard for the rule of law, democratic values and fundamental human rights. In other words, the meetings in Geneva are not only taking place in secret behind the backs of the citizens and lawful residents of the Republic of Cyprus. They are taking place behind the backs of all the citizens and lawful residents of all of the 28 Member States of the European Union. All these people should be concerned by this peculiar and secretive state of affairs.
No less seriously, it appears as if the two stages of meetings in Geneva have been arranged without having been preceded by any consultation exercises or any other democratic mechanisms designed to promote meaningful transparency, proper accountability, access to justice and public participation in decision-making. This notwithstanding the fact that what is at stake in Geneva is the constitutional destiny and treaty framework of a sovereign state which is a Member State of the Commonwealth, the Council of Europe, the European Union and the United Nations.
To make matters altogether worse, the Republic of Cyprus does not yet have in force any freedom of information act along the lines of, say, the ones in the United Kingdom and the United States. Partly as a result, it is very difficult for citizens to find out what is going on behind closed doors and behind their backs.
The absence of a freedom of information act is aggravated by an immature political culture in the Republic of Cyprus. Some elected politicians and public servants do not appear to appreciate that public service requires a service to be provided to the public. One of those services ought to be the free flow of information so that citizens become properly informed and so that elected politicians and public servants may become properly accountable. To cap it all, the Republic of Cyprus has a presidential system of governance.
This notwithstanding the status of the Republic of Cyprus as a former colony of the United Kingdom, the latter of which operates a prime ministerial system. This means that the President of the Republic of Cyprus is not accountable to the House of Representatives in the transparent and multi-dimensional way in which the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom is accountable to the House of Commons and, by extension, the public.
On the one hand, this makes it exceptionally difficult for any academic, let alone any citizen, to find out what is going on – and what is not going on – in the ‘leader-led process’, as the United Nations describes the secretive ‘top-down’ talks between the ‘two leaders’ of the ‘two communities’.
On the other hand, the ‘two leaders’ control which information and which texts are released into the public domain. By the same token, they control which information and which texts are not released into the public domain.
To cognoscenti of the consociational school of political science, as reflected in the seminal works of Arendt Lijphart and other like-minded academics, the ‘top down’ elitism and structural secrecy of the ‘leader-led process’ are explicable. For instance, in a seminal scholarly article published in World Politics in January 1969, Arendt Lijphart explains that ‘Consociational Democracy means government by elite cartel designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy.’
(Source: Arend Lijphart, ‘Consciational Democracy’, World Politics, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Jan., 1969), pages 207-225 at pages 214 and 216.) Therein, however, lies a core defect of the consociational approach: it perpetuates existing divisions and it does so from the top down via an ‘elite cartel’.
In the view of this writer, the ‘leader-led process’ in relation to the Republic of Cyprus is not only steered by an ‘elite cartel’ operating from the top down, but in secret. This means that the ‘leader-led process’ is subject to the dangers associated with secrecy and the limited flow of information into the public domain. The secretive state of affairs brings to mind the celebrated dictum articulated by an American judge, Judge Damon J. Keith of the US Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, in a case concerning the principle of open justice.
According to Judge Keith: ‘Democracies die behind closed doors.’ In this context, Judge Keith explained why, as a matter of principle, secrecy is capable of being so dangerous: ‘When government begins closing doors, it selectively controls information rightfully belonging to the people. Selective information is misinformation.’
(Source: Detroit Free Press v Ashcroft (2002) 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002).)
In the light of the above, a multitude of questions arise. These include those listed in the main body as well as the Appendix of this article. In the meantime, let us go back to the late 1950s, the 1960s and the 1970s as a means of identifying the origins of a divisive and dangerous British-inspired and Turkish-backed proposition: that the fate of Cyprus must be determined by five parties operating behind closed doors and behind the backs of Cypriots. What are the origins of and what is the rationale behind the concept of the ‘five-party conference’, i.e. the mechanism to be used in Geneva on 12 January 2017?
In short, the explanation lies in two concepts.
One is the idea of ‘Intellectual Partition’; this is manifestation of the strategy of Turkey, as formulated and applied during the mid-to-late 1950s and in 1960.
The second is what the author of this article describes as the ‘Macmillan Doctrine’; this is a manifestation of the strategy of the United Kingdom, as formulated and applied during the same epoch.
Also important are two other concepts which are associated with both ‘Intellectual Partition’ and the ‘Macmillan Doctrine’. These are the ‘Mushroom Theory’ and the ‘Soufflé Syndrome’.
The fundamental tenets of Turkish strategy as formulated from 1954 to 1958
‘Intellectual partition’ is a phrase which tripped off the tongue of Fatin Zorlu, the Foreign Minister of Turkey from 1957 until 1960, on 18 November 1958. At the time, the then British Crown Colony of Cyprus was subject to an armed anti-colonial insurgency, an armed British counter-insurgency and what amounted to a diplomatic dispute encompassing Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom. Before we examine what Turkish Foreign Minister Zorlu had in mind on 18 November 1958 when he envisaged the ‘intellectual partition’ of Cyprus, it is important to bear five things in mind.
Firstly, it should never be forgotten that, as Lord Radcliffe observed in a report dated 12 November 1956, ‘the population of the Island’ at the time was ‘formed, as to about 80 per cent., of Greek Cypriots, as to about 18 per cent, of Turkish Cypriots, and … [as to] 2 per cent … of smaller communities of British residents, Armenians, Maronites and others.’
(Source: Lord Radcliffe, ‘Constitutional Proposals for Cyprus’, 12 November 1956, CAB 129/84, National Archives of the UK.)
To all intents and purposes, therefore, the ‘Cyprus problem’ arose during the 1950s for this reason: because Turkey (the imperial ruler of Cyprus from 1571 until 1878) and the United Kingdom (the imperial ruler from 1878 until 1960) did not want the will of the overwhelming majority of the population in Cyprus to prevail; if it did prevail, the island would have passed from the United Kingdom into the hands of Greece.
The confluence of British and Turkish approaches occurred in earnest in the summer of 1954, a few months before the outbreak of the EOKA campaign on 1 April 1955. This confluence is reflected in a remarkable declassified memorandum, dated 21 July 1954, which was submitted to the British Cabinet by Oliver Lyttleton MP, the then Colonial Secretary of the United Kingdom, and Henry Hopkinson MP, the then Minister of State in the Colonial Office. This is what Messrs Lyttleton and Hopkinson wrote on 21 July 1954:
‘Successive Turkish Governments have made it clear that they would not agree to the cession of Cyprus to Greece. They have sound historic, geographic and other reasons for this. Cyprus was Turkish for 300 years. It has never been Greek. The island is 40 miles from Turkey; it is hundreds of miles from mainland Greece. Geographically it is part of Asia Minor. There is a large minority undoubtedly Turkish in origin. The Greek-speaking Cypriot population is of doubtful ethnic provenance.’
(Source: CAB 129/29, C(54)245, National Archives of the United Kingdom.)
Exactly one week later, on 28 July 1954, Minister of State Hopkinson appeared in the House of Commons and, in reply to a question posed by James Griffiths MP, Mr Hopkinson let the cat out of the bag. To quote from the official transcript:
‘ … it has always been understood and agreed that there are certain territories in the Commonwealth which, owing to their particular circumstances, can never expect to be fully independent. [HON. MEMBERS: “Oh.”] I think the right hon. Gentleman [i.e. James Griffiths] will agree that there are some territories which cannot expect to be that. I am not going as far as that this afternoon, but I have said that the question of the abrogation of British sovereignty [in Cyprus] cannot arise — that British sovereignty will remain.’
(Hansard, House of Commons Debates, 28 July 1954, Column 508.)
Secondly, it should never be forgotten that, during the 1950s, the Turkish Cypriots, as Lord Radcliffe described them in 1956, were not concentrated or segregated in any one or more of the six administrative districts of the Crown Colony of Cyprus. As John Maclay, the then Secretary of State for Scotland, reminded the House of Commons in January 1957, the ‘Turkish population’ of Cyprus, as he called it, was at the time ‘intermixed with the Greek population throughout the island, although there are scattered villages and parts of towns where the Turkish population predominate.’
(Hansard, House of Commons Debates, 23 January 1957, Column 184.) These demographic realities were not conducive to any form of geographical segregation or partition.
Thirdly, in the eyes of Mr Zorlu and the government in which he served during the 1950s, Cyprus was a ‘prolongation’ of Turkey. Hence, the support given by Turkey to the post-1954 ‘Cyprus is Turkish’ movement. Indeed, the period from 1954 to 1958 represented the heyday of the ‘Cyprus is Turkish’ movement which was founded in Turkey in 1954, partly in response to the movement in Cyprus in favour of Enosis i.e. the proposed union of Cyprus with Greece.
(See inter alia the analysis of the ‘Cyprus is Turkish’ movement in Christos P. Ioannides, In Turkey’s Image: The Transformation of Occupied Cyprus into a Turkish Province (Aristide D. Caratzas, New York, 1991, at pages 75 to 94.)
During this epoch, Mr Zorlu became one of the chief advocates of the neo-imperial thesis that ‘Cyprus is Turkish’. Indeed, Mr Zorlu effectively expressed this thesis as the official representative of Turkey at the Tripartite British-Greek-Turkish conference held in London from 29 August until 7 September 1955.
According to Mr Zorlu: ‘[B]y its geographical structure [the Island of Cyprus] is a prolongation of the Anatolian Peninsula, of which the soil is Anatolian soil, of which the climate is Anatolian climate …[I]n all the course of history the fate of Cyprus has remained attached to that of the peoples settled in the Anatolian Peninsula and has, in return affected the fate of the peoples living in Anatolia. …’.
(Source: ‘Statement made by M[onsieur] Zorlu at the Fourth Plenary Meeting held on 1 September 1955’, The Tripartite Conference on the Eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus held by the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Greece and Turkey, London, August 29 – September 7 1955 (Cmd 9594, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, London, October 1955), pages 19 to 27 at pages 20, 22, 23.)
Fourthly, it is important to be aware that, by 1958 and in the light of the strategy articulated by Professor Nihat Erim, as approved by Prime Minister Adnan Menderes in 1956, the tenets of Turkish strategy vis-à-vis Cyprus rested on four main doctrinal cornerstones, among others. These were: that Cyprus is an ‘extension’ of Turkey; that the population of Cyprus must be divided into two separate ‘communities’; that the territory of Cyprus must be divided into two separate ‘zones’; and that the two ‘communities’ must be segregated into these ‘zones’ following an exchange of populations. The tenets of Turkish doctrine are visible in various sources. A prime example is the parliamentary statement delivered on 26 June 1958 by Harold Macmillan MP, the then Prime Minister of the United Kingdom:
‘The Turks — I am putting their view — regard Cyprus as an extension of the Anatolian Plain, a kind of offshore island with vital significance for their defence and their security. They say — this has been their argument up to now — that the Turkish-Cypriot community must not be ruled by a Greek-Cypriot community and they have advocated the physical separation of the two communities by means of a territorial partition.’
(Source: Statement of Prime Minister Harold Macmillan MP, Hansard, House of Commons Debates, 26 June 1958, Columns 724-725.)
Fifthly, the Eisenhower Administration in the United States consistently opposed partition during the late 1950s. This meant that, by late 1958, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom were searching for new ways to settle ‘the Cyprus problem’. It was in this context that a novel idea emerged during the last few weeks of 1958: a ‘state’ should come into existence in Cyprus. However, it would not be a normal state. It would be an anomalous entity subject to a ‘bi-communal’ constitution and substantial rights in favour of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, all three of which would become ‘guarantor powers’ of the new state. It was against the background formed by the various matters outline above that ‘Intellectual Partition’ was identified and defined by Fatin Zorlu on 18 November 1958.
What is ‘Intellectual Partition’?
To appreciate the existence of ‘Intellectual Partition’ as a feature of Turkish doctrine, one needs to read a declassified US State Department memorandum of a conversation conducted on 18 November 1958 by Fatin Zorlu, the then Turkish Foreign Minister, with John Foster Dulles, the then US Secretary of State. During this conversation, Mr Zorlu ‘explained’ that the Turkish government envisaged a settlement of the ‘Cyprus Question’ on the basis of ‘a “kind of an intellectual partition” …’.
What did Mr Zorlu mean by ‘Intellectual Partition’? Mr Zorlu clarified that ‘Intellectual Partition’ rested on one overarching philosophical premise: ‘the two communities must be given the idea that neither was being governed by the other …’. Mr Zorlu added that ‘the three governments principally concerned [i.e. Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom] should cooperate to this end’ without inviting the United Nations to ‘mix … in this matter’.
(Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol. X, Part 1, 1958-60: E. Europe Region; Soviet Union; Cyprus (Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State, Washington DC), Document 291.)
In view of the above, it is clear that there is an overlap between ‘Intellectual Partition’ and the ‘Macmillan Doctrine’, the latter of which is explored below. The primary reason for the overlap is that both ‘Intellectual Partition’ and the ‘Macmillan Doctrine’ require Cyprus to be subject to a ‘partnership’ involving five parties namely the ‘two communities’ plus the ‘three guarantor powers’ namely Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom.
The objectives and implications of ‘Intellectual Partition’
In view of the circumstances under which Turkish Foreign Minister Zorlu coined the term in November 1958, it may be stated with reasonable confidence that ‘Intellectual Partition’ equates to a non-territorial form of partition as an interim, if not permanent, measure pending the implementation of a segregated territorial partition. With that and other relevant sources in mind, it may likewise be stated that ‘Intellectual Partition’ strives to achieve various specific objectives.
As an aside, all Member States of the European Union should today be aware of the concept of ‘Intellectual Partition’, particularly at a time when Turkey is not only flexing its muscles beyond its borders and meddling in the domestic affairs of various Member States of the European Union. Indeed, for reasons explained a little later in this part of the article, Turkey is deploying the terminology of ‘Intellectual Partition’ and the ‘Cyprus problem’ in its dealings with individual Member States of the European Union and with Europe and the Greater Middle East as a whole. What, then, does ‘Intellectual Partition’ seek to achieve?
At an international level, ‘Intellectual Partition’ seeks to provide Turkey with a legal, military, educational, economic or other gateway into an overseas territory or a foreign state. In relation to the Republic of Cyprus upon its establishment on 16 August 1960, this gateway was created in two main ways: firstly, by means of the formal and informal ties between Turkey and the Turkish Community, for example in the fields of education, religion and trade; and, secondly, by means of the rights and duties granted to Turkey by the three treaties brought into force in 1960, namely the Treaty of Alliance, the Treaty of Establishment and the Treaty of Guarantee.
Needless to say, ‘Intellectual Partition’ seeks to achieve other objectives in the domestic sphere. As implied by Fatin Zorlu, one of these is to frustrate the principles of majoritarian democracy, unitary self-determination, integration, inclusiveness and pluralism.
Put simply, ‘Intellectual Partition’ seeks to cancel out of the legitimate wishes of the majority of the population. In relation to the Republic of Cyprus, Turkey achieved this objective by calling for and securing the formation of not more than two constitutionally-recognised ‘communities’.
In this way, a numerical ethno-religious minority can be transformed into an ethno-religious ‘community’ carrying equal legal and political weight to the ‘community’ forming the majority. This, incidentally, is what Turkish advocates of ‘bi-communalism’ really mean when they call today for the ‘political equality’ of the ‘two communities’; ‘political equality’ has nothing to do with the principle of individual equality before the law, the latter of which is a humane principle lying at the heart of the rule of law.
‘Political equality’ is, in effect, a politically correct phrase which camouflages what it really means which is ‘Intellectual Partition’. Evidence to this effect may be found today on the website of the Foreign Ministry of Turkey. With reference to the ill-fated Annan Plan of 2004, the Foreign Ministry of Turkey points out that:
‘the Main Articles of the Foundation Agreement [of the ill-fated Annan Plan] envisaged that “the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots affirmed that Cyprus is their common home and acknowledged each other’s distinct identity and integrity and that their relationship is not one of majority and minority but of political equality, where neither side may claim authority or jurisdiction over the other.” …’.
(Source: ‘Cyprus (Historical Overview)’, Foreign Ministry of Turkey: www.mfa.gov.tr/cyprus-_historical-overview_.en.mfa last accessed on 8 January 2017.)
The above is on all fours with the definition accorded to ‘Intellectual Partition’ by Turkish Foreign Minister Zorlu on 18 November 1958, i.e. that ‘the two communities must be given the idea that neither was being governed by the other …’.
Back in 1958, ‘Intellectual Partition’ suited the purposes of Turkey. The explanation lies in the awkward demographic realities on the ground in the then Crown Colony of Cyprus, as already described above. It follows that ‘Intellectual Partition’ required – and requires – the constitutional division of the population of the same sovereign state into not more and not less than two separate ‘communities’.
As events were to unfold, the guiding principles of the Zurich Agreement of 11 February 1959 included ‘Intellectual Partition’ and the ‘bi-communalism’ inherent within it. As admitted in 1960 by Julian Amery MP, the then Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs in the Government of the United Kingdom:
‘The basis of the Zurich Agreement is that there are only two communities in Cyprus. The view strongly held, particularly by the Turkish community, was that there are no other communities but only religious groups.’
(Source: Hansard, House of Commons Debates, 14 July 1960, Column 1732.)
The ‘Intellectual Partition’ of the Republic of Cyprus upon its establishment in 1960
When the Republic of Cyprus was established in August 1960, in line with the ‘Intellectual Partition’ inherent in the Zurich Agreement of 11 February and the subsequent London Agreement of 19 February 1959, its population was crudely divided into not more than two ‘communities’. On closer inspection, this ‘bi-communal’ division was achieved in a ‘bi-ethnic’ as well as ‘bi-faith’ and, thus, quasi-Ottoman way.
The evidence lies in Article 2(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, as introduced in 1960. Under this: ‘the Greek Community comprises all citizens of the Republic who are of Greek origin and whose mother tongue is Greek or who share the Greek cultural traditions or who are members of the Greek-Orthodox Church’. By contrast, ‘the Turkish Community comprises all citizens of the Republic who are of Turkish origin and whose mother tongue is Turkish or who share the Turkish cultural traditions or who are Moslems’.
The reader will note that one ethno-religious ‘community’ is defined with reference to being ‘Greek’ and ‘Greek-Orthodox’ whereas the other ethno-religious ‘community’ is defined with reference to being a ‘Turk’ and a ‘Moslem’.
As for the Armenian, Latin and Maronite citizens of the Republic of Cyprus, they were collectively relegated to a subordinate status. They were collectively denied the right to form ‘communities’ but instead branded as ‘religious groups’.
The religious flavour of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus meant that the new state was, in effect, established on a non-secular basis; this, of course, not only suited the Turks but also Archbishop Makarios who was elected as the President in defiance of the democratic principle that priests should not dabble in politics.
That being said, the historical keys to understanding the ‘bi-faithism’ inherent in Cypriot ‘bi-communalism’ are the ‘bi-faith’ Ottoman millet (religious community) system and the ‘bi-faith’ arrangements which were preserved and adapted by the British after their arrival in Cyprus in 1878. In 1882, for instance, the British imperial authorities cemented this ‘bi-faith’ division of Cypriots by introducing separate adult male electoral lists along strictly religious lines. One electoral list was for adult male ‘Mohammedans’; the other was for adult male ‘non-Mohammedans’.
(Sources: Hansard, House of Commons Debates, 4 May 1882, Column 92 & 18 June 1928, Column 218 & Criton G. Tornaritis QC, Attorney General of the Republic of Cyprus, Cyprus and its Constitutional and Other Legal Problems (Nicosia, 1980), pages 23-25.)
For this and for other reasons, the democratic principle of integration was already undermined in Cyprus by the 1950s. However, the principle of integration was well and truly buried upon the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus on 16 August 1960. The evidence lies in the divisive constitutional provisions relating, for example, to the following:
* the discriminatory constitutional provision requiring a ‘Greek’ to be President and a ‘Turk’ to be Vice-President (under Article 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus);
* the crude division of the citizens of the same sovereign state into two separate ethno-religious ‘communities’ known as ‘the Greek Community’ and ‘the Turkish Community’ (under Article 2);
* the preservation of separate ‘Greek’ and ‘Turkish’ electoral lists (under Articles 63 and 94);
* the formation of separate ‘Communal Chambers’ elected by ‘[t]he Greek and the Turkish Communities respectively’ (under Article 86);
* the maintenance of a segregated education system built around ‘communal primary schools’ within the respective remit of ‘the Greek and Turkish Communal Chambers’ (under Article 20.1 and Article 20.2);
* the constitutional recognition of the ‘Holy Canons’ of the Greek Orthodox Church and of the ‘[Islamic] institution of Vakf and the Principles and Laws of, and relating to, Vakfs …’ (under Article 110); and
* the envisaged creation of ‘[s]eparate municipalities … in the five largest towns … [relating to] the Turkish inhabitants thereof’ (under Article 173.1).
In the event of any new settlement which brings into being an inherently divided ‘bi-communal, bi-zonal federation’, one may expect at least some of the above elements of ‘Intellectual Partition’, such as separate electoral lists and segregated schools, to remain in place. If any proposed settlement envisages the retention of the constitutional recognition of the ‘Holy Canons’ of the Greek Orthodox Church and the ‘[Islamic] institution of Vakf and the Principles and Laws of, and relating to, Vakfs …’, the rule of law surely requires something to happen: each and every one of these Greek Orthodox ‘Holy Canons’ and each and every one of these Islamic ‘Principles’ and ‘Laws’ must be placed into the public domain so that citizens are aware of what they provide and how they may be affected by them in the event of any new settlement coming into force.
‘Intellectual Partition’ as reflected in the ‘Joint Declaration’ of 11 February 2014
Time will tell whether a settlement is around the corner and which texts will be encompassed with it. In the meantime, what is unmistakably clear is that the proposed settlement is built on an unsettling premise flowing from ‘Intellectual Partition’: the key players are ‘Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots’ rather than citizens. This segregationist manifestation of ‘Intellectual Partition’ comes across vividly from the ‘Joint Declaration’ published by the United Nations on behalf of the ‘two leaders’ of the ‘two communities’ on 11 February 2014. At the time, the ‘two leaders’ were Mr Nicos Anastasiades and Dr Dervis Eroglu.
Interestingly enough, the date chosen to unveil the ‘Joint Declaration’, 11 February 2014, was fifty-five years to the day since the conclusion of the Zurich Agreement of 11 February 1959. Was this a coincidence or was it deliberate? The ‘Joint Declaration’ effectively sets out the heads of terms of the proposed ‘settlement’, as formulated by the ‘two leaders’ of the ‘two communities’ on 11 February 2014. Above all, this envisages the formation of a ‘bi-communal, bi-zonal federation’. As such, the ‘Joint Declaration’ is a pure manifestation of ‘Intellectual Partition’ and the ethno-religious segregation which goes with it. The smell of ‘Intellectual Partition’ is emitted by the opening sentence of paragraph 1 of the ‘Joint Declaration’. This does not refer to ‘citizens’ but to ‘Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots’. To quote the opening sentence of paragraph 1 in full:
‘The status quo is unacceptable and its prolongation will have negative consequences for the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots.’ Why is there no mention therein of citizens or of the lawful residents of the Republic of Cyprus? The second sentence of paragraph 1 of the ‘Joint Declaration’ is likewise built upon the cracked foundations of ‘Intellectual Partition’. Thus: ‘The leaders affirmed that a settlement would have a positive impact on the entire region, while first and foremost benefiting Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots …’. Why is there no mention therein of the purported benefits of any settlement for citizens or for the lawful residents of the Republic of Cyprus? Are they subordinate to ‘Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots’? Do they not deserve to benefit from a settlement as much as ‘Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots’?
Other parts of the ‘Joint Declaration’ are constructed in a similar ‘bi-communal’ manner and, thus, on the cracked foundations of ‘Intellectual Partition’. For example, the second sentence of paragraph 3 claims that ‘The united [sic.] Cyprus … shall have a single international legal personality and a single sovereignty … which emanates equally from Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots.’ All of which stands in noticeable contrast to the opening three words of the Constitution of the United States, ‘We the People’. These three words envisage an integrated, multi-ethnic and multi-faith society. However, such a society can never exist if power flows not from ‘the People’ but from ‘Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots’ in line with the divisive objectives of ‘Intellectual Partition’.
The pre-occupation of the ‘Joint Declaration’ with ‘Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots’ and with ‘Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots’, rather than citizens, is part of a broader pattern of ‘Intellectual Partition’ and segregation dating back to the 1950s, if not sooner. This pre-occupation is also perverse, as well as misleading. To take an obvious example, why should a child of ‘Greek Cypriot’ and ‘Turkish Cypriot’ parents be constitutionally coerced into one of the two ‘communities’, as required by ‘Intellectual Partition’ and ‘bi-communalism’?
To take a second example, why should citizens of the Republic of Cyprus who are neither ethnically Greek nor Greek Orthodox nor ethnically Turkish nor Moslem be constitutionally coerced into one of the two ‘communities’? In the view of this author, this form of constitutional coercion is an affront to the dignity of people, such as these, who do not fit easily into the simplistic requirements of ‘bi-communalism’. That said, this undignified ‘bi-communal’ state of affairs is explicable – though not excusable – if one understands the characteristics as well as the objectives of ‘Intellectual Partition’.
‘Intellectual Partition’ and ‘bi-zonality’
If a ‘bi-communal, bi-zonal federation’ is ever formed, a number of deeply divisive ‘bi-communal’ elements of ‘Intellectual Partition’ will be supplemented and reinforced by ‘bi-zonality’, the latter of which is the geographical expression of ‘Intellectual Partition’. Legalised ‘bi-zonality’ will give rise to two legalised ethno-religious ‘zones’, one of which will be administered by the proposed ‘Greek-Cypriot constituent state’ and the other by the proposed ‘Turkish-Cypriot constituent state’.
The above expressions, which catapult ‘Intellectual Partition’ onto a ‘bi-zonal’ territorial basis, appear in the fourth sentence of paragraph 3 of the ‘Joint Declaration’ of 11 February 2014. This provides as follows: ‘All citizens of the united [sic.] Cyprus shall also be citizens of either the Greek-Cypriot constituent state or the Turkish-Cypriot constituent state.’
(Source: ‘Joint Declaration’ of 11 February 2014, as published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark at um.dk last accessed on 7 January 2017.)
‘Intellectual Partition’ and its fatal effect on integration
There seems little or no doubt that ‘Intellectual Partition’ fatally undermines the democratic principle of integration and the ideal of an inclusive yet pluralist society resting on the rule of law and the humane principles of liberal democracy. Most obviously, ‘Intellectual Partition’ achieves this divisive result by creating, maintaining and fostering dual societies, dual organs of governance, dual laws, dual legal systems, dual structures of education and other forms of dualism within the borders of the same sovereign state. In turn, ‘Intellectual Partition’ gives rise to a proliferation of divisive words and phrases which have the effect of reinforcing and perpetuating the very doctrine of division which gave rise to them in the first place; in other words, ‘Intellectual Partition’ generates a self-perpetuating cycle.
In the Republic of Cyprus, the words and phrases generated by ‘Intellectual Partition’ spew out of the mouths of academics, diplomats, journalists, politicians and others on a daily, if not hourly, basis. These include ‘bi-communal’, ‘bi-zonal’, ‘co-existence’, ‘co-operation’, ‘the two communities’, ‘the two sides’, ‘the Greek-Cypriot side’, ‘the Turkish-Cypriot side’, ‘the two leaders’ and so on. Indeed, in view of recent events, this regrettable lexicon of division is now endowed with a new addition: ‘two time zones’.
(See, for instance, Evie Andreou, ‘Cyprus’ New Division: two time zones now a reality, Cyprus Mail (online edition), 30 October 2016.)
The reader will note that each of the above words and phrases is either sub-divided into two by means of a hyphen or alternatively contains the word ‘two’ within it. More to the point, ‘Intellectual Partition’ has been served by the proliferation and daily use of these words and expressions. To begin with, they have helped to preclude the emergence of an integrated society. Furthermore, they have supplemented ‘Intellectual Partition’ with what may be described as ‘Psychological Partition’. As a consequence, many people in the Republic of Cyprus – on both ‘sides’ of the cease-fire lines drawn in 1974 – regard themselves as being primarily ‘Greek Cypriot’ or ‘Turkish Cypriot’ rather than as citizens of the Republic of Cyprus and the European Union of which it forms part. Such people have every right to feel Greek (or Greek Cypriot) or Turkish (or Turkish Cypriot).
In addition, they have every right to adhere to a faith. However, it is one thing to be free to identify oneself with an ethnicity and a faith but quite another for a constitution and a culture to compel one to be affiliated with one of two specific ethnicities and one of two specific faiths. Yet, that is precisely what ‘Intellectual Partition’ has achieved in the Republic of Cyprus. Bearing in mind Aristotle, is this just?
‘Intellectual Partition’ has another poisoned string to its bow. This is the potential to undermine integration by fuelling communalism, ethno-religious factionalism, nationalism and even violence. ‘Intellectual Partition’ does so by instilling in people an overpowering sense of loyalty to their ‘community’. In turn, this can have the effect of overriding any sense of loyalty which people may have to the state. ‘Intellectual Partition’ also has the potential of fostering a confrontational ‘them-and-us’ culture which is inherently capable of inflaming passions and triggering inter-communal clashes, acts of terrorism or aggressive acts of external interference. For the evidence, one need only consider the history of the Republic of Cyprus during its formative years from 1960 to 1974. For the wider dangers flowing from communalism, one may look to the history of other sovereign states whose constitutions or cultures foster the division of citizens along ethnic or religious lines.
Pertinent examples from the past few years include Iraq, Lebanon, Nigeria, Rwanda and Sudan to name but five in alphabetical order. In turn, as the post-1960 history of the Republic of Cyprus demonstrates all too painfully, any deadlocks or clashes flowing from ‘them-and-us’ communalism have the potential to pave the way towards a segregation-based geographical partition on a de facto ‘bi-zonal’ basis or, as envisaged by the ‘Joint Statement’, on a de jure ‘bi-zonal’ basis. To the above, one needs to mention that political leaders are no less capable of being afflicted by the confrontational ‘them-and-us’ mindset generated by ‘Intellectual Partition’. Nothing exemplifies this better than the sight of Mr Anastasiades and his staff sitting along one desk which is situated diametrically opposite another desk where Mr Akinci and his staff are sitting. Such images provide a graphic visual illustration of the ‘them-and-us’ culture fostered by ‘Intellectual Partition’, the ‘bi-communalism’ to which it relates and the related lexicon of division encapsulated by one deeply divisive expression above all others: ‘the two sides’.
(See, for instance, the photographs published by the United Nations website http://www.uncyprustalks.org available at http://184.108.40.206/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/SpeharBK.jpg and http://220.127.116.11/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Leaders-meeting-2016-06-08-3.jpg and http://18.104.22.168/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/2016-07-12-Spehar.jpg)
Why should all this matter to the 28 Member States of the European Union?
Most obviously, it matters because the Republic of Cyprus is a Member State of the European Union and the principle of solidarity surely means that all Member States should take an interest in what has already happened to and what may in the future happen to the Republic of Cyprus. A further reason relates to the location of the Republic of Cyprus at the south-east flank of the European Union and at the front line of the ongoing campaign against the so-called ‘Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant’ and other jihadi forces.
Another reason is that the Republic of Cyprus plays host to many citizens of other Member States of the European Union (such as the writer of this article, who is a citizen of the United Kingdom.)
Nevertheless, there is at least one other reason why all Member States of the European Union should be concerned by the fate of the Republic of Cyprus in line with the concept of ‘Intellectual Partition’. Turkey appears to be fostering features of ‘Intellectual Partition’ in its dealings with various Member States of the European Union and with some of its other neighbours. To take one pertinent example, the Foreign Ministry of Turkey consistently refers to the ‘the Turkish community’ – i.e. not the Turkish minority – ‘living in Germany’ and in other parts of ‘West Europe’. In this regard, it is worth noting that ‘the Turkish community’ in Germany is said to number more than 3 million people.
Another example is provided by France which, according to the Foreign Ministry of Turkey, is ‘hosting a Turkish community of more than 650 thousand [people].’
Is the reference by the Foreign Ministry of Turkey to ‘the Turkish community’ in ‘West Europe’ an accident? What does Turkey mean by ‘the Turkish Community’ of France, Germany and other parts of ‘West Europe’? Does Turkey have in mind the exceptionally wide ethno-religious definition of ‘the Turkish Community’ in Article 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus i.e. ‘the Turkish Community comprises all citizens … who are of Turkish origin and whose mother tongue is Turkish or who share the Turkish cultural traditions or who are Moslems’? To take a second example, in January 2015, the then Prime Minister of Turkey, Professor Amhet Davutoglu, reportedly portrayed his country as the ‘guarantor’ of the ‘Turks and other Muslims’ of Europe. This form of words appears to be consistent with the ethno-religious definition of ‘the Turkish Community’ in Article 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus.
Was it an accident that Prime Minister Davutoglu referred to ‘the Turks and other Muslims of Europe’ in the same breath as the purported status of Turkey as their ‘guarantor’? Does Turkey envisage taking any action, military or otherwise, pursuant to its self-declared status as ‘guarantor’? If so, which action does Turkey envisage taking should it regard such action as necessary? To a third example, in December 2016, President Erdogan referred to the prospect of ‘the solution of the Syria conflict’ and to ‘our capacity as the guarantor together with the Russian Federation’. Was this an accidental deployment of the word ‘guarantor’?
(Sources: ‘Relations between Turkey and the Federal Republic of Germany’, ‘Relations with Turkey and France’, ‘Turkish citizens living abroad’ at: www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-the-federal-republic-of-germany.en.mfa and www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-france.en.mfa and www.mfa.gov.tr/the-expatriate-turkish-citizens.en.mfa last accessed on 7 January 2017, Nurbanu Kizil, ‘PM: Turkey will continue to be a guarantor of Turks and Muslims in Europe’, Daily Sabah, 13 January 2015: www.dailysabah.com/legislation/2015/01/13/pm-scientific-advancement-priority-of-govt last accessed on 7 January 2017 and ‘President Erdogan Addresses Syria Ceasefire with President Putin of Russia’ at:www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/69606/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-ile-rusya-devlet-baskani-putin-suriyedeki-ateskesi-gorustu.html last accessed on 7 January 2017.)
In the light of the above, one wonders what Turkey might do next if it manages to achieve its long-standing objective of transforming the Republic of Cyprus into – or replacing it with – a ‘bi-communal, bi-zonal federation’. Would any such Turkish triumph inspire Turkey to call for legalized ‘bi-communalism’, not to mention legalized ‘bi-zonality’, in other parts of the European Union? Would the formation of a ‘bi-communal, bi-zonal federation’ in one part of the European Union create a precedent which may lead to calls for the formation of legalized ethno-religious ‘communities’ and legalized ethno-religious ‘zones’ in other parts of the European Union?
Perhaps the advocates of the proposed ‘bi-communal, bi-zonal federation’ in Cyprus should mull over the questions posed above. In the meantime, let us now turn to what the author of this article depicts as the ‘Macmillan Doctrine’.
The ‘Macmillan Doctrine’ and the idea of a five-party ‘Turkish, Greek, British, Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot agreement’
As explained above, the Republic of Cyprus was established on 16 August 1960 upon the cracked foundations of ‘Intellectual Partition’. This outcome did not arise by chance. It was due to the crafty diplomacy of Turkey, coupled with the willing assistance provided to Turkey by the United Kingdom, as well as by Greece and by local Cypriot politicians who were all too ready to bow to the will of London and Ankara. Hence the Zurich and London Agreements of February 1959 and the constitutional and legal instruments brought into force in August 1960. More to the point, Turkey achieved its objectives in line with what may be described as the ‘Macmillan Doctrine’. The author of this article has coined this expression for an obvious reason. The ‘Macmillan Doctrine’ is a British-inspired and Turkish-backed belief system inextricably associated with Harold Macmillan. He was the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom from April until December 1955, the Chancellor of the Exchequer from December 1955 until January 1957 and the Prime Minister from January 1957 until October 1963.
The ‘Macmillan Doctrine’ rests on the proposition identified by Prime Minister Macmillan on 19 February 1959, the date of the London Agreement. The proposition is that any settlement in Cyprus hinges upon ‘a Turkish, Greek, British, Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot agreement’.
(See the Statement by Harold Macmillan MP, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Hansard, House of Commons Debates, 19 February 1959, particularly at Columns 618 & 625.)
The reader will have spotted that, even though Prime Minister Macmillan did not use the expression ‘five parties’, he clearly anticipated and welcomed the existence of not more and not less than five distinct parties to the London Agreement. In the words of Prime Minister Macmillan, as expressed on 19 February 1959, these five parties are ‘Greeks and Turks, Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots, and Her Majesty’s Government …’.
(Source: Hansard, House of Commons Debates, 19 February 1959, Column 627.)
The ‘Macmillan Doctrine’, as crystallised via the London Agreement of 19 February 1959, did not emerge from thin air. It was the product of a pattern spread across the period from 1955 to 1959. Accordingly, to understand the ‘Macmillan Doctrine’ properly, let us explore its origins.
The origins of the ‘Macmillan Doctrine’
The origins of the ‘Macmillan Doctrine’ can be traced back to the ‘Tripartite Conference on the Eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus held by the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Greece and Turkey in London’ from 29 August until 7 September 1955.
(Source: Cmd 9594 (Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, London, October 1955).)
In effect, this Conference gave Turkey, as well as Greece, a locus standi in the future of what was supposed to be a British Crown Colony. This in spite of Article 20 of the Treaty concluded in Lausanne, Switzerland, on 24 July 1923, under which: ‘Turkey hereby recognises the annexation of Cyprus proclaimed by the British Government on the 14th November, 1914.’ No parties, other than Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, were represented at the ‘Tripartite Conference’ in 1955. Accordingly, the ‘Conference’ unfolded behind closed doors and behind the backs of Cypriots. The ‘Conference’ also formed the backdrop to the anti-Greek pogrom in Istanbul. (For details as to the latter, see Speros Vryonis, Jr, The Mechanism of Catastrophe: The Turkish Pogrom of September 6-7, 1955, and the Destruction of the Greek Community of Istanbul (Greekworks.com, New York, Second Printing, 2005)).
The organisation of the Tripartite Conference was critical. It established the British-inspired and Turkish-backed idea that Cyprus was subject to a ‘Tripartite’ international relationship encompassing Turkey and the United Kingdom, as well as Greece i.e. three of the five parties recognised by the ‘Macmillan Doctrine’. In this context, it should not go without saying that the British Foreign Secretary at the Tripartite Conference was none other than … Harold Macmillan. As events were to unfold, the ‘Macmillan Doctrine’ did not properly start to gain traction until after the landmark statement delivered on 19 December 1956 by Alan Lennox-Boyd MP, the then British Colonial Secretary. Not only did the Lennox-Boyd statement bring into the open the new Turkish-backed policy of the United Kingdom i.e. ‘that the exercise of self-determination in such a mixed population must include partition among the eventual options.’
To all intents and purposes, the Lennox-Boyd statement also affirmed that, in so far as the United Kingdom was concerned, the population of Cyprus was already subject to a ‘bi-communal’ demographic division, as reflected in the existence of the two entities which Mr Lennox-Boyd described as ‘the Greek Cypriot community’ and ‘the Turkish Cypriot community’.
(Source: Hansard, House of Commons Debates, 19 December 1956, Columns 1267-1279.)
All of which goes to show that the ‘Intellectual Partition’ propagated by Turkish Foreign Minister Zorlu on 18 November 1958 was, in effect, inspired or backed by the British from 19 December 1956, if not sooner. To cap it all, the Lennox-Boyd statement had the effect of confirming that, in the eyes of the United Kingdom, the parties to any future ‘settlement’ in Cyprus would indeed be five: the two aforementioned ‘communities’ plus Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom. This is the inevitable conclusion one reaches if one reads the Lennox-Boyd statement and the declassified British documents relating to it.
(In relation to the above, see inter alia Klearchos A. Kyriakides, ‘The Lennox-Boyd statement of 19 December 1956 and the origins of the proposed ‘bi-communal, bi-zonal federation in Cyprus’, Agora Dialogue, 27 December 2016 available at: http://agora-dialogue.com/2016/12/27/the-lennox-boyd-statement-of-19-december-1956-and-the-origins-of-the-proposed-bi-communal-bi-zonal-federation-in-cyprus/ last accessed on 5 January 2017.)
On 19 December 1956, when Mr Lennox-Boyd delivered his landmark statement, Harold Macmillan was serving as the Chancellor of the Exchequer in 11 Downing Street. However, on 9 January 1957, Prime Minister Anthony Eden resigned in disgrace, albeit officially for reasons of ill health; Eden was said to have suffered a nervous breakdown. Eden resigned in the aftermath of the botched Anglo-French invasion of Egypt which, incidentally, was launched from Cyprus and Malta. More to the point, on 9 January 1957, HM The Queen accepted the resignation of Mr Eden and on 10 January 1957 she formally appointed Harold Macmillan as the new Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. Mr Macmillan therefore moved from Number 11 to Number 10 Downing Street.
Accordingly, it may be noted that the fate of the Republic of Cyprus may be determined in line with the ‘Macmillan Doctrine’ in Geneva in January 2017, i.e. exactly sixty years since the transfer of prime ministerial power from Mr Eden to Mr Macmillan in January 1957. This is not without irony. With Harold Macmillan firmly ensconced in 10 Downing Street by the end of January 1957, the ‘Macmillan Doctrine’ began to take shape as Mr Macmillan tried to keep a lid on an ongoing crisis he had inherited. Thus, on 19 February 1957, exactly two years before the London Agreement, one of the core tenets of the ‘Macmillan Doctrine’ was crisply identified as follows by John Profumo MP, the then Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies:
‘The crux of the Cyprus problem is to reach an agreement, or at least a modus vivendi, between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the island, and the Greek and Turkish Governments in the international sphere. That is the basic fact of the situation, and we shall achieve a peaceful settlement in Cyprus only if we do not forget that fact. It is to this end that Her Majesty’s Government policy has been and will continue to be directed.’
(Source: Hansard, House of Commons Debates, 19 February 1957, Column 234.)
It was implicit in the remarks of Mr Profumo that any ‘agreement’ relating to Cyprus also needed to be blessed by the United Kingdom, the fifth actor in this drama. In this context, it should not go unremarked that Mr Profumo later attended the Lancaster House Conference in his then capacity as a junior minister in the Foreign Office. In 1963, Mr Profumo was serving as the Secretary of State for War until he resigned in disgrace after he had misled Parliament (and others, including his wife) over his affair with Christine Keeler. To the embarrassment of the British establishment, Ms Keeler had been conducting an affair with Mr Profumo while also sharing her affections with the Soviet Naval Attaché in London and with various other gentlemen, some of whom had shady backgrounds.
(For details into this extraordinary scandal, see inter alia Lord Denning’s Report Presented to Parliament (Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, London, September 1963).)
The ‘Macmillan Doctrine’ as applied in 1958 by the ill-fated ‘Adventure in Partnership’ i.e. the ‘Macmillan Plan’
On reflection, the ‘Macmillan Doctrine’ burst onto the political stage on 19 June 1958. On that date, Prime Minister Macmillan unveiled his ill-fated ‘Adventure in Partnership’, otherwise known as ‘the Macmillan Plan’. In the words of Mr Macmillan himself, this equated to a proposed ‘partnership plan’ involving five partners in the governance of a post-settlement Cyprus. More specifically, the ‘Macmillan Plan’ envisaged the formation of ‘an adventure in partnership — partnership between the communities in the island and also between the Governments of the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey.’
(Source: Harold Macmillan MP, Prime Minister of the UK, Hansard, House of Commons Debates, 19 June 1958, Columns 1315-1320 at Column 1316.)
Tellingly, the Oxford Dictionary defines the noun ‘adventure’ as ‘[a]n unusual or daring experience’. An adventure might also give rise to the ‘[e]xcitement associated with danger or the taking of risks’. An adventure might even equate to ‘[a] reckless or potentially hazardous action or enterprise’. No less tellingly, the Oxford Dictionary defines the word ‘partnership’ as ‘[t]he state of being a partner or partners’. The same source explains that the root of the word ‘partner’ is to be found in the Latin word partitio. Interestingly enough, partitio is a Latin noun meaning ‘partition’.
(Source: www.oxforddictionaries.com/ published by Oxford University Press)
All of which speaks volumes.
The ‘Adventure in Partnership’ may not have envisaged a strict geographical partition, at least not in the short term. However, it rested on the premises inherent in ‘Intellectual Partition’ and the ‘Macmillan Doctrine’: that the population of Cyprus was carved up into ‘two communities’; and that, in all, five separate ‘parties’ had a stake on the island which necessitated their participation in any settlement. In consequence, the fundamental message transmitted by the ‘Macmillan Doctrine’ is that sovereignty does not lie with – and can never lie with – Cypriots as a collective whole or with their elected representatives in any Cypriot variant of the Parliamentary sovereignty in found in Westminster.
All this comes across clearly from Mr Macmillan’s analysis as to the ‘policy’ which resulted in the proposed ‘Adventure in Partnership’. This ‘policy’, Mr Macmillan explained to the House of Commons on 8 July 1958, ‘had four main purposes’. These were:
‘(a) To serve the best interests of all the people of the island. ‘
(b) To achieve a permanent settlement acceptable to the two communities in the island and to the Greek and Turkish Governments. ‘
(c) To safeguard the British bases and installations in the island, which are necessary to enable the United Kingdom to carry out her international obligations. ‘
(d) To strengthen peace and security, and co-operation between the United Kingdom and her Allies, in a vital area.’
If point (a) amounted to the payment of lip service to the British imperial subjects inhabiting the then Crown Colony of Cyprus, points (b), (c) and (d) reflected the core principles embodied in both ‘Intellectual Partition’ and the ‘Macmillan Doctrine’. They also envisaged a settlement reached by five separate parties. It is here that one finds the doctrinal overlap between ‘Intellectual Partition’ and the ‘Macmillan Doctrine’. As pointed out on 8 July 1958 in the context of the ‘Macmillan Plan’ by one perceptive Liberal peer, Lord Rea:
‘As I read and understand them, the proposals which have been put forward by Her Majesty’s Government for a solution of this problem are fundamentally based on the principle of partnership. Two principles, or two foundations, were mentioned by Mr. Lennox-Boyd, the Colonial Secretary in another place [i.e. the House of Commons]: the foundation of partnership and the foundation of communal autonomy. To my way of thinking, the foundation of partnership must be a permanency; the foundation of communal autonomy is a stepping stone to unity within the island. That is the way in which I think these two foundation stones referred to in another place by the Colonial Secretary ought to be regarded.’
(Source: Hansard, House of Lords Debates, 8 July 1958, Column 702-703.)
Lord Rea was spot on when he identified the existence of the two ‘foundations’ or ‘principles’. However, he was wrong to assume that ‘communal autonomy’ would ever lead to ‘unity’. As events subsequently unfolded – and this is a warning which should be heeded by any Member States of the European Union contemplating any grant of ‘communal autonomy’ to any ethnic or religious minority – the grant of ‘communal autonomy’ in Cyprus proved to be the thin end of a very long wedge.
The ‘Adventure in Partnership’ came to nothing in the short term as it failed to be welcomed by all five parties, as Mr Macmillan had wished. Eventually, however, the ‘Macmillan Doctrine’ was one of the main guiding spirits behind the Zurich Agreement of 11 February 1959 and the London Agreement of 19 February 1959.
What does all this have to do with the five-party ‘Conference on Cyprus’ in Geneva on 12 January 2017?
To begin with, the ‘Macmillan Doctrine’ is the key to understanding Turkey’s demand that any Cyprus-related ‘conference’ must involve not more and not less than ‘five parties’. In addition, notwithstanding the demise of the ‘Macmillan Plan’ and its proposed ‘Adventure in Partnership’, the word ‘partnership’ lies at the core of the Turkish lexicon of division relating to Cyprus.
According to the Foreign Ministry of Turkey, for instance, the Republic of Cyprus was established in 1960 as a ‘partnership Republic’ and a ‘bi-national partnership State, based on the political equality of the two peoples as co-founder partners of the new Republic …’. For his part, meanwhile, Mr Mustafa Akinci, in his purported capacity as the ‘President’ of the illegal ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’, has repeatedly invoked the concept of ‘partnership’ and the ‘partners’ which, in his view, go with it. For example, on 15 November 2016, Mr Akinci envisaged that in the event of any forthcoming settlement: ‘The TRNC will take its place in an honorable solution as an equal partner’.
(Sources: ‘Cyprus (Historical Overview)’, Foreign Ministry of Turkey: www.mfa.gov.tr/cyprus-_historical-overview_.en.mfa last accessed on 8 January 2017 and ‘President Akinci: “The TRNC will take its place in an honorable solution as an equal partner’, 16 November 2016:http://pio.mfa.gov.ct.tr/en/president-akinci-the-trnc-will-take-its-place-in-an-honorable-solution-as-an-equal-partner/ (last accessed on 8 January 2017.)
The above utterances by the Foreign Ministry of Turkey and by Mr Akinci underline an awkward reality. Even though Mr Macmillan ceased to be Prime Minister in 1963 and even though he died in 1986, the ‘Macmillan Doctrine’ did not die with him. It lives on. Indeed, it looks as if the ‘Macmillan Doctrine’ and ‘Intellectual Partition’ may be two of the main guiding spirits at the ‘Conference on Cyprus’ involving five parties in Geneva on 12 January 2017.
The bi-lateral Zurich Agreement of 11 February 1959 and the five-party London Agreement of 19 February 1959
As indicated above, even though the ‘Macmillan Plan’ bit the dust, the thrust of the ‘Macmillan Doctrine’ was implemented in secret in two stages in February 1959. The first stage involved two parties, Greece and Turkey, whose prime ministers met in secret in Zurich and reached an agreement on 11 February 1959. The second stage followed in London almost immediately thereafter. This subsequent stage involved all five of the parties recognized by the ‘Macmillan Doctrine’.
More specifically, the second five-party stage unfolded in secret at a ‘Conference’ held at Lancaster House, opposite Buckingham Palace in London, from 17 February until the London Agreement was reached on 19 February 1959. The unspoken primary purpose of the ‘Conference’ at Lancaster House was to rubber-stamp the package of texts embodied in the London Agreement which was a British-backed variation of the Zurich Agreement.
It bears repeating that the ‘Macmillan Doctrine’ required not more and not less than five parties to be represented at Lancaster House. The parties were officially described in the London Agreement of 19 February 1959 as Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom plus the two entities mentioned below.
Of these two entities, one was described in parts of the London Agreement as ‘the Greek Cypriot Community’ (i.e. with no hyphen separating ‘Greek’ and ’Cypriot’ and with two capital ‘C’s). In other parts of the London Agreement, this entity was described as ‘the Greek-Cypriot community (i.e. with a hyphen but with one upper-case ‘C’ and one lower case ‘c’) and elsewhere as ‘THE GREEK-CYPRIOT COMMUNITY’ (i.e. with a hyphen and capital letters).
The other entity was described in parts of the London Agreement as ‘the Turkish Cypriot Community’ (i.e. with no hyphen separating ‘Turkish’ and ’Cypriot’ and with two capital ‘C’s). In other parts of the London Agreement, this entity was described as ‘the Turkish-Cypriot community (i.e. with a hyphen but with one upper-case ‘C’ and one lower case ‘c’) and elsewhere as ‘THE TURKISH-CYPRIOT COMMUNITY’ (i.e. with a hyphen and capital letters).
If the discrepancies pinpointed above suggest that the London Agreement was cobbled together in a rush and in absence of any proper process of consultation, word-by-word scrutiny and public participation in decision-making, this should come as little surprise. After all, as everybody knows, mistakes are made when people rush. It goes without saying that both the Zurich and London Agreements were reached behind closed doors and behind the backs of Cypriots. Neither was preceded by any consultation exercise or referendum. Nor was either followed by any consultation exercise or referendum. When the London Agreement was concluded on 19 February 1959, the ‘Greek Cypriot Community’ was represented by Archbishop Makarios and the ‘Turkish Cypriot Community’ was represented by Dr Fazil Kutchuk.
Neither of these two gentlemen appears to have possessed any specific electoral mandate to enter into the binding commitments they entered into at Lancaster House. Not for the first time in history – and not the for the last time – the fate of Cypriots was determined in secret by politicians operating behind closed doors, behind their backs and in the absence of any proper consultation exercises. To all intents and purposes, therefore, the London Agreement constituted a peculiar ‘arranged marriage’ involving five ‘partners’. The ‘marriage’ was engineered by Turkey, backed by Greece, facilitated by the United Kingdom (with the tacit support of the United States) and rubber-stamped by a priest under severe pressure (if not blackmail or coercion, as alleged by some writers such as Peter Wright in Spycatcher) plus a politician evidently dancing to the tune of Turkey. The ‘marriage’ was then sprung on Cypriots who had absolutely no say in the matter. Is it any wonder that within a few years the ‘arranged marriage’ eventually broke down? For these and for other reasons, moral if not legal question marks continue to hang over the legitimacy of the Lancaster House Conference and the London Agreement of 19 February 1959. More to the point, the London Agreement set in stone the ‘Macmillan Doctrine’. Indeed, the ‘Macmillan Doctrine’ is guaranteed to survive in perpetuity, unless and until the London Agreement and the legal instruments it has spawned are lawfully abrogated or otherwise lawfully consigned to history. That is unlikely to happen as long as ‘five parties’ are dedicated to renewing their ‘marriage vows’ via the modification of the treaty structure built in 1960 and the creation of a new ‘bi-communal, bi-zonal federation’. All of which helps to explain why the ‘Conference on Cyprus’ in Geneva on 12 January 2017 is so critical. Among other things, the ‘Conference’ may result in the renewal of ‘Intellectual Partition’ and the ‘Macmillan Doctrine’.
The ‘Mushroom Theory’
It would be remiss of the author of this article not to say a word or two about the secretive practices which are effectively required by ‘Intellectual Partition’ and the ‘Macmillan Doctrine’. These secretive practices are manifestations of the ‘Mushroom Theory’.
The author first came across the ‘Mushroom Theory’ when he read an interesting article on the subject which was published in 2012. It was evocatively entitled ‘Unravelling the Mushroom Theory in Cyprus’.
(See Marina Theodotou, ‘Unraveling the Mushroom Theory in Cyprus’, Huffington Post, 24 February 2012: www.huffingtonpost.com/marina-theodotou/unraveling-the-mushroom-t_b_1300377.html last accessed on 6 January 2017).
That said, the origins of the ‘Mushroom Theory’ can be traced back to the secret horse-trading which resulted in the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1878. In more recent times, the ‘Mushroom Theory’ was effectively articulated during the winter of 2009/10 in both a parliamentary statement and in a newspaper interview given by Chris Bryant MP, the then Parliamentary Under-Secretary in the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office. In the House of Commons on 3 December 2009, Mr Bryant responded to the then meetings between Messrs Christofias and Talat by making the following claim: ‘… sometimes talks of this nature, which are very sensitive, grow – a bit like mushrooms – best in the dark.’
(Source: Hansard, House of Commons Debates, 3 December 2009, Column 1307. Also see Mr Bryant refer to mushrooms in Isaac A. Karipidis, ‘Edging closer to a solution?’ Athens News, 11 January 2010.)
The fundamental problems inherent in the ‘Mushroom Theory’ are obvious. To begin with, certain mushrooms have hallucinogenic effects. Others are poisonous. Some can kill. In the submission of this writer, it is undemocratic, unfair, unconscionable and incompatible with the rule of law for the constitutional and legal future of what is supposed to be a democratic Member State of the European Union to be decided by politicians drafting texts in secret, in the absence of any proper consultation exercises and in the absence of any freedom of information legislation. The author makes the above submission mindful of the secret procedures adopted prior to the publication of the draft constitutional and federal laws in the ill-fated Annan Plan of 2004. He also makes this submission mindful of the basic principle of democracy and the rule of law which was articulated in 2003 by US Court of Appeals Judge Diane Wood: ‘neither laws nor the procedures used to create or implement them should be secret …’.
(Source: Diane Wood, ‘The Rule of Law in Times of Stress’ (2003), quoted in Dialogue on the Rule of Law (American Bar Association, Chicago, 2008), page 5 available online at:www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/publiced/features/FinalDialogueROLPDF.authcheckdam.pdflast accessed on 20 December 2015).
In relation to environmental matters, the ‘Mushroom Theory’ is also contrary to the spirit if not the letter of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (‘the Aarhuus Convention of 1998) which was adopted on 25 June 1998. Tellingly, the State Parties to this Convention include the Republic of Cyprus, Greece and the United Kingdom, but not Turkey, the Occupying Power in the north of the Republic of Cyprus.
(Source: United Nations Treaty Collection at: https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=XXVII-13&chapter=27&clang=_en last accessed on 9 January 2017.)
In relation to the Aarhuus Convention 1998, it is worth quoting from Article 1, which speaks volumes: ‘In order to contribute to the protection of the right of every person of present and future generations to live in an environment adequate to his or her health and well-being, each Party shall guarantee the rights of access to information, public participation in decision-making, and access to justice in environmental matters in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.’ Far from acting in line with the spirit of the Aarhuus Convention and the principles of transparency and public participation in decision-making to which it relates, the ‘two leaders’ have given the impression that they would prefer to shelter in the darkness cast by the ‘Mushroom Theory’. Indeed, on 11 December 2015, one of the ‘two leaders’, Mr Mustafa Akinci, issued a remarkable statement in which he ventured some peculiar thoughts which were entirely consistent with the secretive ‘mushroom theory’. To quote Mr Akinci: ‘The time [has come] for concentrated peace talks in Cyprus, where the parties to the solution should be locked up in a room and not allowed out until they reach an agreement …’. Astonishingly enough, Mr Akinci went further. He suggested that the ‘two leaders’ should adopt a variation of the secretive procedure, known as the papal conclave, which is followed by cardinals when choosing a new Pope.
To quote Mr Akinci once again: ‘You know how they choose the new Pope? They all gather in one place and they do not go out until they choose one, [and then] you see smoke coming out …’. Mr Akinci ended this exposition on the mysteries of the Vatican with a warning: ‘This the last effort of my generation to find a solution under a federal roof. … We need to solve the issue in months, not years.’
(Source: ‘Akinci: “A similar type of meeting to that of choosing the Pope is necessary”’, 11 December 2015: http://mfa.gov.ct.tr/akinci-a-similar-type-of-meeting-to-that-of-choosing-the-pope-is-necessary/ last accessed on 12 December 2015).
In view of the secretive two-stage procedure adopted in Geneva in January 2017, it appears as if Mr Akinci has had his way. In consequence, secrecy, elitism and top-down decision-making have prevailed to the detriment of transparency, consultation and public participation in decision-making.
All of which brings us neatly to what the author of this article describes as the ‘Soufflé Syndrome’.
The ‘Soufflé Syndrome’
The ‘Soufflé Syndrome’ is the counterpart to ‘Intellectual Partition’, the ‘Macmillan Doctrine’ and the ‘Mushroom Theory’. As such, the ‘Soufflé Syndrome’ is one of the keys to understanding all those occasions in Cypriot history when there has been a rush to reach a settlement within a short space of time via two inter-linked stages or by other procedurally unfair means.
As a stepping stone to explaining what is meant by the ‘Soufflé Syndrome’, one is obliged to ask an important set of inter-linked questions. Why was the five-party ‘conference’ at Lancaster House arranged to begin on 17 February 1959, i.e. so soon after the bi-lateral meeting which concluded in Zurich with the agreement reached on 11 February 1959? Why was a five-party meeting arranged to begin in Geneva on 8 August 1974, i.e. so soon after a previous tripartite conference had ended on 30 July 1974? By the same token, why has a five-party ‘Conference on Cyprus’ been scheduled to begin in Geneva on 12 January 2017, i.e. so soon after the bi-lateral meeting in Nicosia between Messrs Anastasiades and Akinci scheduled to begin in Geneva on 9 January 2017?
There is clearly a pattern on display here. In turn, this begs a question. Why is there such a rush to complete two stages in Geneva in such a short space of time?
The explanation appears to lie in what the author of this article describes as the ‘SouffléSyndrome’. This owes its name to the remarks of Ambassador Birgi of Turkey in London at the time of the composition of the London Agreement. Thanks to the research of Robert Holland, it is known that according to Ambassador Birgi: ‘The agreement reached [in Zurich] was like a souffléwhich must be eaten at once, otherwise it will collapse.’
(Source: ‘Record of meeting at Carlton House Gardens, 11 February 1959’, FO 371/144640, RGC 1073/28, National Archives of the UK, as quoted by Robert Holland, Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1954–1959 (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998), page 306.)
What Ambassador Birgi seemed to fear was widespread criticism or ridicule of the Zurich Agreement resulting in its demise. In fearing such an outcome, Ambassador Birgi appears to have exhibited a contempt for core principles of democracy, such as consultation, word-by-word scrutiny and accountability. To him, what appeared to matter most was the reaching of a deal, the approval of that deal and the implementation of that deal.
Does the ‘Soufflé Syndrome’ account for the rushed procedure relating to the two scheduled stages in Geneva in January 2017? It may be one factor. Another factor, of course, may be the expiry of the Presidency of Barack Obama on 20 January 2017. In that regard, it seems rather unusual that such a ‘Conference’ has been arranged during President Obama’s last few days in the White House. Is this because the Obama Administration wishes to lumber the new Trump Administration with a fait accompli?
For the sake of the long term reputation of President Obama and his place in history, one sincerely hopes that he does not end his term of office by overseeing a segregationist settlement in Cyprus which perpetuates ‘Intellectual Partition’ and subverts the principles of non-segregation which he has eloquently espoused during the existence of the Obama Administration from January 2009 until January 2017.
If, in line with the ‘Soufflé Syndrome’, agreement is reached in Geneva in January 2017, one can expect the ‘Soufflé Syndrome’ to kick in yet again, this time via the organization of two ‘separate simultaneous referenda’. These instruments of ‘Intellectual Partition’ first reared their heads on 24 April 2004 in relation to the ill-fated ‘Annan Plan’. That said, they have been resurrected by the first sentence of paragraph 4 of the ‘Joint Declaration’ of 11 February 2014: ‘The united Cyprus federation shall result from the settlement following the settlement’s approval by separate simultaneous referenda.’ This wording seems to envisage, firstly, the conclusion of a ‘settlement’ and, secondly, the subsequent holding of two referenda on a ‘settlement’ which has been presented to two sets of electorates as a non-negotiable fait accompli.
One of the ‘two leaders’, Mr Akinci, has disclosed that in the event a settlement being reached in Geneva there will be a ‘strenuous’ post-settlement and pre-referenda process. Its aim would be to prepare the relevant constitutional and legal instruments before they are made the subject of two ‘separate, simultaneous referenda’. To quote from one of the speeches of Mr Akinci, as reported on 30 December 2016:
‘We shall need to fill in the framework of a settlement. A constitution and federal laws will need to be drafted. No doubt, strenuous work will have to be carried out to finalize even the smallest details before the first half of 2017. It is possible to complete all this in a couple of months if the political framework exists. The last mile is always the hardest’.
(‘Akinci: “We head off to Geneva, unwavering and determined, with the goal of establishing a new federal Cyprus where Cypriots can live equally in freedom and security”, press release of the ‘TRNC Public Information Office’, 30 December 2016: http://pio.mfa.gov.ct.tr/en/akinci-we-head-off-to-geneva-unwavering-and-determined-with-the-goal-of-establishing-a-new-federal-cyprus-where-cypriots-can-live-equally-in-freedom-and-security/ last accessed on 9 January 2017.)
In mature liberal democracies, such as the United Kingdom, it sometimes takes many months before a single piece of proposed legislation is subjected to a consultation exercise and thereafter drafted, scrutinized and enacted. Yet, astonishingly enough, Mr Akinci envisages each and every one of the constitutional and federal laws of a post-settlement Cyprus to be composed in just ‘a couple of months’. This beggars belief. It also puts one on enquiry. Why the rush? Is this anything to do with the ‘Soufflé Syndrome’?
‘Intellectual Partition’, the ‘Macmillan Doctrine’ the ‘Mushroom Doctrine’ and the ‘soufflé syndrome’ as applied from 1960 to 1974
When the Republic of Cyprus was established on 16 August 1960, what was the combined outcome of ‘Intellectual Partition’, the ‘Macmillan Doctrine’, the ‘Mushroom Theory’ and the ‘SouffléSyndrome’?
The immediate outcome was that the Republic of Cyprus took its place in the United Nations and the Commonwealth as a peculiar, perverse and polarised ‘bi-communal’ sovereign state subject to the dangers inherent in communalism. More specifically, one relatively small island became independent, subject to one horrendously complicated constitution, one ‘Greek’ cleric as the President, one ‘Turk’ as the Vice-President, two ethno-religious communities, two communal chambers, two education systems, two systems of family justice, two British sovereign base areas, three religious groups, three international treaties, three sets of foreign military forces and three guarantor powers. These powers were soon joined by an array of underground paramilitary forces operating outside the law.
To use a quintessentially English expression, this amounted to a dog’s breakfast. In due course, particularly during the last few weeks of 1963, disaster struck. To begin with, the Republic of Cyprus was gripped by a destabilizing constitutional crisis sparked by the communalism exhibited by the two political elites of the ‘two communities’. This rupture in inter-communal relations became aggravated by destructive inter-communal fighting which had devastating consequences. In turn, this inter-communal upheaval led to blood-soaked acts of external interference.
In combined consequence, the dog’s breakfast was now laced with poison or, perhaps to be more precise, it was laced with even more poison than had hitherto been the case.
In the immediate aftermath of the aforementioned constitutional crisis and conflagration in the Republic of Cyprus, the United Kingdom resorted to activating the ‘Macmillan Doctrine’. Thus, on 2 January 1964, the then Commonwealth Relations Secretary, Duncan Sandys MP, announced that:
‘I have tonight received from Archbishop Makarios and Dr. Kutchuk their acceptance of the offer of good offices of the British, Greek and Turkish Governments to help in the solution of the problems of Cyprus. For this purpose, a Conference of representatives of these three Governments and of the two communities will be convened in London at an early date. …’. (Source: Hansard, House of Commons Debates, 14 January 1964, Columns 35-36.)
This British initiative did not result in any agreement by the five parties mentioned by Mr Sandys. However, the initiative demonstrated that the United Kingdom remained wedded to the ‘Macmillan Doctrine’ and to the five parties at its core. The initiative also demonstrated that the Republic of Cyprus was a curious creature on the world stage. In the eyes of the United Kingdom, as indicated above, the Republic of Cyprus equated to – and, in some respects, was effectively subordinate to – the ‘two communities’ established by the ‘bi-communal’ Constitution of 1960. All of which precluded the Republic of Cyprus from ever becoming a genuine liberal democracy resting on the principles of equality, integration and inclusion.
United Nations Security Council Resolution 186 of 4 March 1964
In the Spring of 1964, the United Nations made its first main entrée into the affairs of the Republic of Cyprus. It did so via United Nations Security Council Resolution 186 of 4 March 1964.
To begin with, Resolution 186 expressly reminded everybody of the general prohibition in Article 2, paragraph 4 of the United Nations Charter of 1945:
‘All Members [of the United Nations] shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.’
Resolution 186 moved on to make various calls. One was a call ‘upon all Member States, in conformity with their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, to refrain from any action or threat of action likely to worsen the situation in the sovereign Republic of Cyprus, or to endanger international peace’. Another call was for the formation of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus.
More to the point, Resolution 186 inflicted a gentle blow to the ‘Macmillan Doctrine’. The gentle blow was inflicted because Resolution 186 not only upheld the existence of the Republic of Cyprus and the sustained legality of its government, notwithstanding the effective withdrawal of members of the Turkish Community from that government. In addition, Resolution 186 effectively recognised that there were at least six, not five, central actors in the Cypriot drama. To use the terminology of Resolution 186, these actors were ‘the communities in Cyprus and their leaders’ plus ‘the Governments of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom’.
(Source: Resolution 186 of 4 March 1964 published by the United Nations at:www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/186(1964) last accessed on 8 January 2017.)
Notwithstanding Resolution 186 of 1964, there was no settlement of the ‘Cyprus problem’ in the ten years which followed. For the purposes of this article, two points may be noted in connection with those years.
The first point to note is that from 1964 onwards Turkey and the leadership of the Turkish Community were pressing for the transformation of the Republic of Cyprus into a ‘federation’, subject to ‘bi-communal’ governance and an exchange of populations resulting in the formation of two separate as well as segregated ‘zones’. Some of the contemporaneous evidence to this effect has been reproduced in the previous two articles of the author published in Agora Dialogue on 27 December 2016 and 2 January 2017 respectively.
The second point to note is that from 1964 until 1974, the prospect of a new ‘five-party conference’ continued to flicker into view, but it never quite materialized. This was partly because of the stance adopted by President Makarios, as expressed by his representative during the inter-communal talks of that era, Mr Glafcos Clerides. In this regard, reference may be made to a statement delivered to the media by Mr Clerides on 29 April 1971. In this statement, Mr Clerides emphasized the following:
‘As repeatedly stated, we are against any five-power conference in Cyprus before a preliminary solution of the … constitutional issues is arrived at by negotiations by the two sides in Cyprus and therefore … we will not agree to a five power conference at this stage.’
(Source: Associated Press Archive at:www.aparchive.com/metadata/youtube/1778f1f950d336008a66357b8cf98077 and atwww.youtube.com/watch?v=QDQT5vIHH7c last accessed on 7 January 2017.)
Bearing in mind that the late Glafcos Clerides was the mentor of Nicos Anastasiades, it would be interesting to find out why the latter has departed from the principle specified by Mr Clerides back in 1971. Perhaps Mr Anastasiades could clarify.
The ‘Conference’ in Geneva from 8 until 14 August 1974: A case study in gunboat diplomacy
Notwithstanding Resolution 186 of 1964, which effectively stated that there were six actors in the Cypriot drama, ‘Intellectual Partition’, the ‘Macmillan Doctrine’, the ‘Mushroom Theory’ and the ‘Soufflé Syndrome’ returned with a vengeance in 1974. The background was formed by the coupmounted in Nicosia on 15 July 1974, the first phase of the Turkish invasion of the Republic of Cyprus which was launched on 20 July 1974 and the collapse of both the junta in Athens and thejunta-backed coupist regime in Nicosia by 24 July 1974.
The first phase of the Turkish invasion resulted in the occupation and ethnic cleansing of parts of Kyrenia District and a bridgehead fanning out from Kyrenia down to the northern suburbs of Nicosia.
What followed was a two-stage process in Geneva which evokes comparisons with the two-stage process adopted in Zurich and in London in February 1959 and with the two-stage process adopted in Geneva in January 2017.
To begin with, the three guarantor powers convened in Geneva on 25 July 1974. Their secret talks resulted in the ‘Geneva Declaration’ of 30 July 1974. To all intents and purposes, this product of the ‘Mushroom Theory’ was predicated on both ‘Intellectual Partition’ and the ‘Macmillan Doctrine’, as well as the new de facto realities on the ground. After all, the three guarantor powers:
‘… recognised the importance of setting in train as a matter of urgency, measures to adjust and to regularise within a reasonable period of time the situation in the Republic of Cyprus on a lasting basis …’.
‘To this end they [i.e. Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom] agreed that further talks should begin on 8 August 1974, at Geneva. They also agreed that representatives of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities should, at an early stage, participate in the talks relating to the constitution.
‘The Ministers noted the existence in practice in the Republic of Cyprus of two autonomous administrations, that of the Greek Cypriot community and that of the Turkish Cypriot community. Without any prejudice to the conclusions to be drawn from this situation, the Ministers agreed to consider at their next meeting the problem raised by their existence.’
(Source: www.moi.gov.cy/MOI/pio/pio.nsf/All/595D15A8C314FB45C22572750054D01E?OpenDocument last accessed on 7 January 2017.)
In Geneva a few days later, on 8 August 1974 – the day on which President Nixon resigned in disgrace in the United States – a fresh round of ‘talks’ duly began in Geneva. For the purposes of this article, it suffices to refer to the declassified British ‘Record’ of the last of these ‘talks’. This was a ‘meeting’ held at 6.40pm on 13 August 1974.
In accordance with the ‘Macmillan Doctrine’, five parties were present: a ‘British Delegation’ headed by James Callaghan MP, the then Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom; a ‘Greek Delegation’ headed by George Mavros, the Foreign Minister of Greece; a ‘Turkish Delegation’ headed by Turan Gunes, the Foreign Minister of Turkey; the ‘Greek Cypriot Community’ which was represented by Glafcos Clerides; and the ‘Turkish Cypriot Community’ which was represented by Rauf Denktash. Also present was a delegation of observers from the United Nations.
In keeping with the ‘Macmillan Doctrine’, the Republic of Cyprus was not listed by the British ‘Record’ as having any delegation at the ‘meeting’ which unfolded. This in spite of the fact that the Republic of Cyprus had been invaded, was subject to an occupation and was being invited to engage in radical constitutional restructuring at the behest of Turkey.
What, then, happened in Geneva from 6.40pm on 13 August until 2.25am on 14 August 1974? Against a background formed by human rights violations and what appear to have been widespread acts of criminality in the Republic of Cyprus – from forced evictions to forcible transfers and from rapes to murders – Foreign Minster Gunes of Turkey and Mr Denktash laid down the terms under which the ‘Greek Cypriot Community’ was expected to surrender. In other words, the unspoken primary purpose of the ‘meeting’ was to ascertain whether the ‘Greek Cypriot Community’ would sign up to what would have amounted to an instrument of surrender.
‘The solution found in Geneva should be accepted by the two communities in Cyprus.’
The ‘options’ placed before Mr Clerides were as crude as they were segregationist.
The first ‘option’ was the one submitted by Mr Denktash at an earlier meeting involving Messrs Callaghan, Clerides and Denktash at 4.40pm on 12 August 1974. At this earlier meeting, Mr Denktash ‘had asked for an administrative zone comprising 34 per cent of Cyprus because, according to the latest figures [which must remain in doubt] Turkish Cypriots owned 34 per cent of the land. This figure was however negotiable.’
In response to this request by Mr Denktash for the formation of two ‘zones’ under a new ‘federal’ republic, ‘Mr Callaghan asked how many people would have to move to create two homogeneous administrative zones.’ This prompted Mr Clerides to estimate ‘a figure in excess of 100,000.’ Be that as it may, Mr Callaghan ‘said he had a feeling in favour of some measure of geographical separation.’ A little later, Mr Callaghan ‘wondered fatalistically whether Cyprus might have to go through a period of misery and chaos.’
(Source: Keith Hamilton and Patrick Salmon (Historians of the Foreign & Commonwealth Office) (eds.), British Documents on British Policy Overseas Series III, Volume V: The Southern Flank in Crisis 1973-1976 (Routledge on behalf of The Stationery Office, Abingdon, 2014), Document 70, pages 210 to 212.)
The second ‘option’ was the one put forward by Foreign Minister Gunes of Turkey. In addition to having in mind a radical programme of constitutional restructuring along ‘federal’ lines, Mr Gunes had in mind a radical programme of territorial restructuring along ‘cantonal’ lines. As regards the proposed constitutional restructuring, the view of Mr Gunes was that ‘Cyprus was a Sovereign State, but the Guarantor Powers were obliged by the Treaty of Guarantee to give their approval to any change in the Constitution.’ This, of course, was consistent with the ‘Macmillan Doctrine’.
Accordingly, Mr Gunes proceeded to ask the following question, which confirmed that, in the eyes of Turkey and in line with the ‘Macmillan Doctrine’, not more and not less than five parties could amend the Constitution and reach any related settlement: ‘Why should Mr Clerides and Mr Denktash not agree on a draft Constitution. And the five parties then meet to agree the results. The solution found in Geneva should be accepted by the two communities in Cyprus.’
The above form of wording was nothing other than a synthesis of the core tenets of ‘Intellectual Partition’, the ‘Macmillan Doctrine’, the ‘Mushroom Theory’ and the ‘Soufflé Syndrome’.
In relation to the territorial horse-trading on the table in Geneva, Mr Gunes favoured the formation of a number of segregated ‘cantons’, rather than two ‘regions’ or ‘zones’, as Mr Denktash had proposed. That said, Messrs Gunes and Dentkash were at one in favour of the division of territory, the segregation of people and the federalization of governance. In the words of Mr Gunes: ‘The important and non-negotiable elements were: geographical separation and federation within a single state.’
The menacing prospect of a proposed ‘surgical operation’
Against this unedifying background in Geneva, Mr Denktash laid down what amounted to a veiled threat:
‘He [i.e. Mr Denktash] thought that in 20 years time Cyprus would be a sort of Switzerland withenosis forgotten and permanent happiness for the people. The proposed surgical operation was a little harsh for the time being but it would bring about real communal happiness. …’.
What did Mr Denktash mean by ‘[t]he proposed surgical operation’? Did he envisage the second phase of the Turkish invasion which began a few hours or minutes after he uttered this phrase? Did he have any advance knowledge of such military action? Did his reference to a ‘proposed surgical operation’ constitute a threat or other form of intimidation?
The smell of ‘an ultimatum’
For his part, Foreign Minister Mavros of Greece pitched in to say that ‘the failure of the 1960 Constitution had been due to its hurried drafting’. With this evidently in mind, Mr Mavros took a dim view of what Mr Gunes had proposed which was the composition of a new constitution within an exceptionally tight time-frame. Mr Mavros went on to comment on ‘[t]he Turkish demand for an immediate answer’ to the terms laid down by Turkey and Mr Denktash. According to Mr Mavros, this ‘smelt of an ultimatum.’
In relation to the procedure and timeframe before the five parties in Geneva, ‘Mr Callaghan asked Mr Clerides if, with an adjournment for 48 hours, … [Mr Clerides would] be able to answer the question on cantons, functions and administration [of the proposed federation]’. In reply, ‘Mr Clerides said he would be able to give a definite answer in 48 hours to Mr Denktash’s and Mr Gunes’s proposals and the other questions.’ Mr Clerides deemed it necessary to return home before giving a final answer. To quote from the British ‘Record’ of the meeting:
‘Mr Clerides said that the reason he wanted to go to Cyprus was not to gauge public opinion but to consider with his advisers the serious considerations with which he was faced. … It was unfair to pressurize him to accept something as serious as this without consultation with his advisers and further to imply that if he did not accept the Turkish Army would march. If the Turkish Army marched the Greek Cypriot people would fight. Mr Clerides said he had not rejected Mr Gunes’ or Mr Denktash’s propsosals but he refused to be cornered in this way.’
In common with so many citizens of the Republic of Cyprus, Mr Clerides was indeed ‘cornered’. It was as if he was a fox which had been hunted down and surrounded by a hungry pack of hounds. One can therefore sympathise with his extraordinary predicament, which bordered on being blackmailed, coerced or put under duress. That said, one can criticize Mr Clerides for not having the presence of mind to call for a consultation exercise with citizens or a referendum or the activation of any other mechanism of democracy. Instead, in an application of the ‘Mushroom Theory’, Mr Clerides spoke of consulting his advisers, presumably behind closed doors and behind the backs of citizens. This in spite of the huge human consequences of any Turkish-induced programme of constitutional and demographic restructuring in favour of ‘federation’.
Mr Mavros responded to Mr Clerides’ claim that he was ‘cornered’ by making the following point: ‘they had been asked to take a decision under pressure of an ultimatum. A deadline had been fixed in the manner of a victorious commander on a battlefield.’ Mr Mavros added mournfully:
‘He had been asked to discuss at gunpoint a matter not in the Security Council Resolution, not covered in the Treaty of Guarantee, and with the request of a representative of the Republic of Cyprus for 48 hours’ adjournment ignored. … He said they could not continue discussions under these circumstances. He thought it was necessary to give an immediate report to the United Nations Secretary-General on what had been happening here.’
This line of argument provoked Mr Gunes into re-activating the ‘Soufflé Syndrome’ and lacing it with a chilling warning:
‘If they were looking for ways to get guns to rust by diplomatic means, one day those guns would blow up. … Their request for [a] postponement was merely procrastination until circumstances were in their favour. Mr Gunes asked for a statement from Mr Clerides and Mr Mavros in principle to geographical separation.’
In response to this and other points, ‘Mr Clerides said that he would be prepared to consider both proposals carefully and with an open mind, and to give a reply in 48 hours.’
The British Record reveals that after further fruitless discussions:
‘Mr Clerides and Mr Mavros said that they were prepared to return to Geneva on Thursday morning [i.e. two days later]. Mr Callaghan confirmed that he also was prepared to do so. Mr Denktash said that he was bound to the Turkish Government; he would come if the Turkish Foreign Minister would do so. Mr Gunes said nothing. The conference broke up at 2.25am.’
(Source: Keith Hamilton and Patrick Salmon (Historians of the Foreign & Commonwealth Office) (eds.), British Documents on British Policy Overseas Series III, Volume V: The Southern Flank in Crisis 1973-1976 (Routledge on behalf of The Stationery Office, Abingdon, 2014), Document 76, pages 224 to 242.)
During the early hours of 14 August 1974, the Turkish tanks began to roll in what appeared to be fresh acts of naked aggression ostensibly contrary to inter alia Article 2(4) of the UN Charter plus the various prohibitions in Article 6 of the Nuremberg Charter of 1945 and the Geneva Conventions of 1949. In other words, ‘Phase 2’ of the Turkish invasion was underway, as was the ‘surgical operation’ envisaged by Mr Denktash in Geneva.
What followed was another de facto process of demographic engineering with deadly, destructive and dehumanizing implications. The upshot was the neo-imperial Turkish occupation and ethnic cleansing of approximately 37 per cent of the territory and as much as 57 per cent of the coastline of the Republic of Cyprus.
Some reflections on the conduct of Gunes and the apparent use of gunboat diplomacy in Geneva
The conduct of Turkish Foreign Minister Gunes in Geneva is difficult if not impossible to reconcile with Article 2, paragraph 4 of the United Nations Charter of 1945. This not only prohibits the ‘use of force’ but the ‘threat’ of any ‘use of force’. To quote Article 2, paragraph 4 once again:
‘All Members [of the United Nations] shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.’
In the light of the above, there exists compelling evidence to support the proposition that, via the conduct of Foreign Minister Gunes (if not via the conduct of Mr Denktash), Turkey not only engaged in gunboat diplomacy in Geneva in flagrant breach of Article 2, paragraph 4 of the United Nations Charter. Turkey intended to engage in gunboat diplomacy.
If the declassified British documents are to be believed, the conduct of Foreign Minister Gunes in Geneva after 6.40pm on 13 August 1974 was no accident. The evidence to this effect lies in a declassified telegram from British Foreign Secretary Callaghan; this was sent to the Foreign Office on his behalf by Anne Warburton at 12.15pm on 13 August 1974, i.e. just a few hours before the ostensible show of gunboat diplomacy by Mr Gunes after 6.40pm on the same date. To quote from the words of Foreign Secretary Callaghan as they are recorded in the said telegram:
‘At 10am this morning [i.e. 13 August 1974] Clerides handed Denktash a counter-proposal which, while it conceded administrative autonomy and some grouping of Turkish villages, excluded the possibility of a geographical zone or of population movements. I [i.e. Foreign Secretary Callaghan] told Clerides and Mavros that this would not, in my judgement, satisfy the Turks. They had to face the reality that there would be no United States military pressure, that UNFICYP would not oppose the Turkish forces and that, as a result, there was no prospect of external help against Turkish aggression. I urged them to produce a counter-proposal which at least conceded the principle of geographical separation. Clerides said that he could not do so from Geneva: Greek Cypriot opinion was not ready and Makarios, with whom he spoke yesterday, would certainly disavow it. They [i.e. Messrs Mavros and Clerides] agreed to fly to Athens and Nicosia to discuss the principle with their colleagues and to return tomorrow night with a clear answer.
‘I [i.e. Mr Callaghan] conveyed this to Gunes. His reaction was that whilst there was no Turkish ultimatum, the time limit for consideration ran out at 22:00 hours tonight: (this kind of statement is typical of the Gunes method of discussion [Mr Callaghan added in brackets]) that the Turkish Government would probably not agree to extend the time limit: and that he [i.e. Mr Gunes] must insist on a prior declaration that Clerides accepted both the principle of a geographical zone and the need to draw it in broad terms in the next two days. He [i.e. Mr Gunes] indicated that some of the details were still negotiable: he mentioned an area of 30-34 per cent for the Turkish zone. But he could not accept the idea of three weeks of negotiation in Nicosia. …’.
(Source: Keith Hamilton and Patrick Salmon (Historians of the Foreign & Commonwealth Office) (eds.), British Documents on British Policy Overseas Series III, Volume V: The Southern Flank in Crisis 1973-1976 (Routledge on behalf of The Stationery Office, Abingdon, 2014), Document 73, pages 218 to 220.)
In the light of the above, various questions arise and these appear in the list of questions in the Appendix to this article.
To all intents and purposes, it appears that the main objective of what will unfold in Geneva in January 2017 remains the same as the objective of Mr Denktash, as endorsed by Turkish Foreign Minister Gunes, in Geneva in August 1974. This objective is the hasty conclusion of a settlement to transform the Republic of Cyprus into – or replace it by – a ‘federation’ encompassing two ‘communities’ and two ‘zones’ one of which is a legalized Turkish ‘zone’ in the region of 30 to 34 per cent of the territory of the proposed ‘federation’.
The main difference between Geneva in August 1974 and Geneva in January 2017 is that the core demands of Mr Denktash, as expressed in 1974, now carry the stamp of approval by the United Nations Security Council in the form of Resolution 649 of 1990 and 750 of 1992. In the submission of this author, this approval may convey a semblance of legality to the proceedings in Geneva. However, these proceedings and their fundamental objective are manifestly unfair, unethical, unjust and unconscionable.
It is said that ‘crime never pays’, but what may unfold in Geneva in January 2017 may run counter to that wise saying. After all, Turkey may be on the brink of cashing in its ill-gotten gains and having them effectively laundered with the knowing assistance of the United Nations. Any such outcome would give rise to a stain on the conscience of humanity. It would also serve as a perpetual reminder that the unethical and unlawful use of force can sometimes yield dividends.
Indeed, as the author argued in his previous article in this series being published by Agora Dialogue, the formation of the proposed ‘federation’ would deal a devastating blow to the credibility and the integrity of the post-1945 legal order.
Looking to the future, the future of the Republic of Cyprus must surely be built in a procedurally fair manner and on substantively democratic, humane, inclusive and just foundations. For that to happen, the Republic of Cyprus, the European Union and the United Nations must turn their collective backs on ‘Intellectual Partition’, the ‘Macmillan Doctrine’, the ‘Mushroom Theory’, the ‘Soufflé Syndrome’ and the ‘bi-communalism’, ‘bi-zonality’ and segregation with which they are all now inextricably associated. In turn, this requires a collective effort to condemn the use of brute force, to promote the rule of law, to serve justice, to uphold liberal democracy, to champion the principle of integration and to replace secrecy with transparency. It is a tall order, but it is well worth striving for. The destiny of democracy depends on it.
- Published by Agora Dialogue on 9 January 2017
Dr Klearchos A. Kyriakides is an Assistant Professor of Law at the Cyprus Campus of the University of Central Lancashire and the Co-ordinator of its programme dedicated to the Rule of Law and the Lessons of History. The author declares an interest as a British citizen with roots in Lysi and Petra, two ethnically-cleansed villages in the Turkish-occupied areas of the Republic of Cyprus; on a voluntary unpaid basis, he is also an independent academic consultant of Lobby for Cyprus, a non-party-political NGO based in London which campaigns on behalf of displaced persons from the Turkish-occupied area of the Republic of Cyprus. Crown Copyright material quoted in this article is reproduced by permission of the Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office. The author records his sincere gratitude to Ms Fanoulla Argyrou for her insights based on her extensive research at the National Archives of the United Kingdom.
- views expressed in this article are personal.
© Klearchos A. Kyriakides, Larnaca, January 2017
In the light of the contents of the above article, various questions arise. Some of these are listed below. In the interests of the rule of law, democracy and transparency, Mr Nicos Anastasiades (in his capacity as President of the Republic of Cyprus and in his separate capacity as ‘Leader’ of the Greek Community) is hereby invited to provide written replies to all of the questions listed below before he attends the five-party ‘Conference on Cyprus’ on 12 January 2017.
1. Does Mr Anastasiades endorse the divisive principle upon which Article 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus is founded, i.e. that the citizens of the same sovereign state must be constitutionally divided from one another on the basis of ethnicity, language and religion with one ‘community’ defined inter alia with reference to membership of the Greek-Orthodox Church and the other defined inter alia with reference to Moslems? If so, why?
2. If the Greek Community and the Turkish Community are to be expressly preserved under any settlement, are the ethno-religious definitions of the Greek Community and the Turkish Community embedded in Article 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus of 1960 to be expressly incorporated within the constitutional instruments of the proposed ‘bi-communal, bi-zonal federation’? If so, how?
3. Under any settlement, are the ‘Holy Canons’ of the Greek Orthodox Church and ‘the Principles and Laws of, and relating to, Vakfs …’ – as referred to in Article 110 of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus – going to be expressly recognized by the constitutional instruments of the proposed ‘bi-communal, bi-zonal federation’?
4. Is each and every one of the ‘Holy Canons’, ‘Principles and Laws’, as referred to in Question 3, already in the public domain? If so, where may they be found?
5. Under the constitutional instruments of any settlement, will the three existing ‘religious groups’, as established under Article 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960, continue to occupy a subordinate status to the Greek Community and the Turkish Community?
6. Bearing in mind the substantial number of Anglican Christians, Russian Orthodox Christians, Buddhists, Hindus, Jews and others who lawfully reside in the Republic of Cyprus, will the constitutional instruments of any settlement recognize the existence of any new ‘religious groups’?
7. In which specific circumstances in Geneva in January 2017 or subsequently will Mr Anastasiades be negotiating or otherwise acting as the ‘Leader’ of the Greek Community?
8. In which specific circumstances in Geneva in January 2017 or subsequently will Mr Anastasiades be negotiating or otherwise acting as President of the Republic of Cyprus?
9. Which will take precedence in Geneva in January 2017 or subsequently: the loyalty of Mr Anastasiades to the ‘Greek Community’ and its members, or the loyalty of President Anastasiades to the Republic of Cyprus and its citizens and lawful residents as a collective whole?
10. What will happen in Geneva in January 2017 or subsequently if a conflict of interest arises (or if a significant risk of one arises) between the loyalty of Mr Anastasiades to the Greek Community and the loyalty of President Anastasiades to the Republic of Cyprus?
11. In Geneva in January 2017 and subsequently, who will act as the legal advisers of (i) President Anastasiades in his capacity as President of the Republic of Cyprus and (ii) Mr Anastasiades in his capacity as ‘Leader’ of the Greek Community? Put another way, will one set of legal advisers act for both President Anastasiades (in his capacity as President) and Mr Anastasiades (in his capacity as ‘Leader’)?
12. Bearing in mind the loyalty of Mr Anastasiades to the Greek Community (and, by extension, to members of the Greek-Orthodox Church, as per Article 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus) and the loyalty of Mr Akinci to the Turkish Community (and, by extension, to Moslems, as per Article 2), who in Geneva will be responsible for protecting: (i) the interests of the Republic of Cyprus and its citizens as a collective whole; (ii) the interests of the Armenian, Latin and Maronite religious groups; (iii) the interests of the adherents of other faiths such as Buddhism, Hinduism and Judaism; and (iv) the interests of all lawful residents of the Republic of Cyprus who are not ‘Greek Cypriot’ or ‘Turkish Cypriot’?
13. Before travelling to Geneva, did either President Anastasiades (in his capacity as President of the Republic of Cyprus) or Mr Anastasiades (in his capacity as ‘Leader’ of the Greek Community) or Mr Akinci (in his capacity as ‘Leader’ of the Turkish Community) instigate any fair and otherwise proper consultation exercises in relation to any of the matters which will be under discussion in Geneva? If so, when and how were such consultation exercises carried out? If not, why were none carried out?
14. Will President Anastasiades (in his capacity as President of the Republic of Cyprus) and Mr Anastasiades (in his capacity as ‘Leader’ of the Greek Community) provide unqualified undertakings not to enter into any legally binding commitments before he has launched and taken account of fair and otherwise proper consultation exercises in the Republic of Cyprus in relation to any proposed new constitutions, laws, treaties, amendments to treaties or other texts?
15. Why has Turkey never been properly held to account for launching an invasion in two phases, for engaging in what appears to have been gunboat diplomacy in Geneva in August 1974, for ostensibly violating Article 2, paragraph 4 of the United Nations Charter on 20 July and 14 August 1974, for ostensibly committing crimes and for infringing so many other provisions and principles of international law?
16. Will Turkey be held to account under any new settlement of ‘the Cyprus problem’?
17. Why was the United Kingdom so unwilling to honour its duty under the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960 to ‘recognise and guarantee the sovereignty, territorial integrity and security’ of the Republic of Cyprus?
18. Why has the United Kingdom never been properly held to account for its actions or omissions over the summer months of 1974? Under any settlement, will the United Kingdom be held to account for its actions or omissions?
19. Why has the United Nations Security Council bowed to the will of Turkey and the late Mr Denktash, as articulated in Geneva in August 1974, by expressly endorsing the proposed formation of a ‘bi-communal, bi-zonal federation’ under Resolutions 649 of 1990 and 750 of 1992?
20. Why have successive Presidents of the Republic of Cyprus since 1990 bowed to the will of Turkey and the late Mr Denktash, as articulated in Geneva in August 1974, by expressly endorsing the proposed formation of a ‘bi-communal, bi-zonal federation’?